Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August, 2010
Not quite ready to walk in off the street.
I HAVE long advocated for the use of local personnel and companies in stability operations. There are enormous advantages to the larger mission including economic stimulation, technical capacity building and cost savings. It is also worth highlighting the fact that companies in our Contingency Contracting Industry prefer to use local personnel and subcontractors for practical reasons including, again, cost savings, knowledge of local languages, street smarts and more. In short, working with locals offers international contractors a competitive edge over their rivals. In recent years the U.S. Congress grasped this concept and has made requirements that contingency contractors working U.S. contracts in Afghanistan utilize local Afghan companies as much as possible. Now they are recognizing there are inevitable trade-offs with this course of action.
Taxpayers in donor nations benefit from the utilization of locals in contingency operations, and the industry benefits from the expertise of local subcontractors, so what’s not to like? Unfortunately, a number of drawbacks to local services have made the news of late: stories of local contractors providing substandard services, cutting corners, employing shoddy equipment and under-trained personnel, being under the control of powerful warlords, or even paying the enemy to facilitate safe passage for convoys. These stories have focused particularly on local Afghan private security companies (PSCs).
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 - July/August, 2010
Ethnic Uzbeks fleeing violence in Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
CHAMPIONED as an “island of democracy” in 1990s, invoking the country’s embrace of liberal democracy and free market economy, Kyrgyzstan today verges on becoming an island of chaos with a potential to destabilize the region. Indeed, in the wake of two violent government overthrows within a five-year period and further bloody massacres in the country’s south this June, the current interim government’s failure to establish legitimacy and rule of law could have dire consequences.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August, 2010
The choice of security can reflect on the client.
RISK management when it comes to security is not about the what: it is about the who. Who a security firm employs, and who they task to provide said security. What is important is the individual’s qualifications, his or her experience, the understanding of the client’s mission, the understanding of the environment, and, as always, the company’s best practices, lessons learned and resource allocation.
As recent events have vividly demonstrated, failure to carefully select a private security company (PSC) can result in significant problems for clients ― be they government agencies, NGOs or private firms ― seeking to protect people and assets both at home or abroad. Taking the time and making the effort to choose the right PSC is the surest way to minimize or all together avoid such problems. It also helps ensure you are working with a company that will deliver the services you need in the manner you require.
Good contracted security starts with hiring quality personnel and managing them throughoutthe contract period. In today’s economy, with tight budgets and an emphasis on cutting costs, there is an undeniable temptation for clients to make their security decisions based on cost alone. However, though cutting corners may reduce initial costs, chances are that such a strategy will result in longer-term problems.
If cost does form a very large component of the decision-making process, you must ask yourself: What skills are you willing to tradeoff quality for cost?
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August, 2010
An idyllic destination, with views of the ocean and a peacekeeping operation.
EVERY year thousands of employees within humanitarian and missionary organizations travel across the world to countries plagued by war, disease and natural disasters. In many of these often dangerous environments, risk is part of everyday life. Some risk is avoidable and some is not. Regardless, employers have both a humanitarian and a legal duty to protect their employees by reducing and mitigating this risk.
Over recent times, we have witnessed a number of high profile events around the world that have impacted the well-being of both leisure and humanitarian travelers. These have included earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, and riots and civil disturbance in Greece, India, Jamaica and Thailand. Sadly though, this year is no different from any other. Over the previous decade we have seen terrorist attacks as far afield as Mumbai, New York, Madrid, Moscow and London, natural disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami and floods in New Orleans, and civil unrest in many more countries. There catastrophes represent only one facet of the dangers in traveling as they do not even take into account getting there in the first place; as incidents such as the Air France disaster in the Atlantic Ocean or the Afriqyah Airlines crash in Tripoli demonstrate.
The threat of civil litigation and obligations under occupational health and safety laws and regulations understandably concentrates the minds of every responsible employer regarding the safety and wellbeing of their staff from a legal and ethical perspective. In the case of work-related travel (and specifically in regards to humanitarian organizations that frequently send staff to less secure locations) this means the importance of ensuring there is a process in place to manage the welfare of employees, from pre-trip risk assessment to taking care which forms of transport and accommodation are taken and when.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August 2010
We want answers.
IN February of this year, a multinational aerospace and defense contracting company paid nearly $500 million to the U.S. Department of Justice and the British Serious Fraud Office to settle a case involving allegations of corruption. Given the sheer size of the penalty – and that of the company that paid it – one would think that the company would soon play the role of poster child in the ongoing debate surrounding proposed reforms of the defense procurement system. But that has not been the case. In fact, the company just won a multimillion contract from the Army Research, Development and Engineering Command, just one of the many pieces of new business they have garnered since the settlement was announced.
How did the company emerge unscathed? Not only was its performance for the customer as close to impeccable as exists in this day and age; it aggressively articulated that record to public and private stakeholders that run the gamut from the general public to members of Congress. When taken alongside its well-publicized charitable and educational initiatives, the company had conditioned the marketplace to be forgiving of its missteps. Simply put, the company’s efforts to build a strong brand before a reputational crisis arose elicited a “that’s not the company I know” response when a blemish inevitably occurred.
The word “inevitable” is key, because the current reputational landscape is as challenging as it has ever been for defense contractors and the peace operations industries. Budget deficits and good-old-fashioned politics have dovetailed to drive vastly increased government scrutiny. Meanwhile, every unfortunate misstep by a government contractor involved with either large weapons systems or on-the-ground operations has emboldened opponents’ attacks and claims of “war profiteering,” an incendiary charge in today’s environment.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August, 2010
The Department of Justice could take a keen interest in your operations.
IN this hyper-intensive environment of corporate scrutiny, the Department of Justice (DOJ) acts as the pre-eminent federal regulator of corporate culture. DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, also known as the Filip Memorandum, affirmatively establish the government’s interest in using criminal prosecutions to achieve institutional reform in a corporate setting. Anticipating and defending against these structural enforcement actions requires an effective compliance program.
The Filip Memorandum underscores the importance of an effective corporate compliance program, which is commensurate with that company’s resources and business risks. In this post-Enron era of heightened regulatory enforcement designed to target corporate fraud, an effective compliance program deters criminal conduct by its employees and agents, and, thereby, helps avoid an investigation in the first place. Moreover, in light of the increasing criminalization of business conduct, it can persuade law enforcement that the company did not intend to benefit from the errant behavior of its employees and agents, thereby reducing the likelihood of a corporate prosecution under the Filip Memorandum.
Today, the government enjoys extraordinary leverage over companies facing the risk of an enforcement action. The imbalance of power between the government and the company is explained by the following two factors: the Draconian consequences of an indictment; and the elastic notions of corporate criminal liability.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August, 2010
Carolyn McAskie.
CAROLYN McAskie, OC, is currently a Senior Fellow in the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. She previously served as Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding (2006−2008), Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of the U.N. Peacekeeping Operation in Burundi (2004−2006), as well as Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator at the U.N. Secretariat in New York (1999-2004), and Emergency Relief Coordinator (1999−2001). Ms. McAskie is an Officer of the Order of Canada and a Director of Canadem and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.
JIPO: How can a peacekeeping operation proceed when there is no apparent peace to be kept?
McAskie: The concept of modern peacekeeping has changed so much that there is very rarely a peace to be kept. There is often a situation in countries where there is a combination of peaceful areas maybe in agreement with the government, but fighting still going on in other parts. Modern peacekeeping goes way beyond just patrolling the line of two parties who find a peace agreement. Modern peacekeeping forces now need to be prepared to work with the local authorities to stabilize parts of the country. You could say that most current operations fall into the category of where there is no peace to keep — so it is not unusual at all.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August 2010
Rebuilding Haiti will be an uphill task.
IN managing post-disaster reconstruction, a complex series of decisions need to be made almost immediately by all those involved. Despite this pressure, one must remember that these decisions will have long-term impacts on those affected by the disaster. Ideally, reconstruction policy would have been defined by government before the disaster, but there are few countries where this is the case. Therefore, defining and deliberating over the reconstruction policy will generally occur in the precious time after the disaster.
The Communities Group International (TCGI) was contracted by the World Bank, beginning in 2008, to prepare a handbook on post-disaster housing reconstruction. The World Bank intended the handbook to assist government policy makers and government and donor project managers engaged in large-scale post-disaster reconstruction programs make decisions about how to reconstruct housing and communities after natural disasters.[1] This article describes the key findings and recommendations from the handbook, and proposes what a reconstruction project in one town in Haiti that conforms to the best practices identified in the handbook might look like.
International experience — and the case studies in the reconstruction handbook — clearly demonstrate that reconstruction policy defined by government should encompass five key areas: the Institutional Strategy, the Financial Strategy, the Community Participation Approach, the Reconstruction Approach and Risk Management. At the same time, it also shows that local communities can and usually want to be put in charge of many of the operational practicalities of the reconstruction process. This combination of “top-down policy” and “bottom-up operations” has repeatedly been shown to be the most effective and efficient way to manage reconstruction.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August 2010
Painting a picture of lessons learned from Iraq
FROM the Balkans to Baghdad, the United States has repeatedly deployed civilian and military assets to execute stabilization and reconstruction operations over the past two decades. But the mixed results of these endeavors reveal that the U.S. government has not yet found a successful approach to effectively managing such interagency assistance operations.
Over the past six years, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has published more than 350 reports, documenting every facet of the Iraq reconstruction program. In the course of doing so, SIGIR has developed an extensive catalogue of lessons learned, many of which are applicable to current and future stabilization and reconstruction operations. Foremost among these lessons is that the United States lacks an integrated management office to plan and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations, thwarting unity of command and inhibiting unity of effort.
To fill this gap, SIGIR has proposed the creation of the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO) to plan and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. Working closely with the Chief of Mission, the USAID mission director and the military commanders, USOCO’s director would manage all stabilization and reconstruction efforts for the life of the stabilization or reconstruction operation.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August 2010
Opinions welcome.
PLACING the people of Afghanistan at the center of the ongoing debate on the lingering war against extremism and terrorism is the key to the success of international peace building efforts in the country. Yet, this is rarely done. Afghans, as the main victims of the past thirty years of imposed conflicts on their country, seldom figure into the ongoing discussions of the past, present and future of Afghanistan. In other words, the moral obligation of helping Afghans build a strong state, a secure future, increasingly appears to have become secondary to preserving foreign national security interests in Afghanistan.
Indeed, the Afghan people would have built a functioning state and Afghanistan ’s development would have slowly taken off by now had Afghanistan not become a victim of both the Cold War and its aftermath, the culmination of which was the tragedy of September 11, 2001. But Afghanistan decided to side with the West against the Soviets in the last decade of the Cold War. Of all the nations in the West or in the East, and since the end of the Second World War, Afghans made the ultimate sacrifice to help defend and ensure the freedom of then “the Free World” or our NATO nation-partners today.
