Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 1 – July-August, 2011
Pakistan's fortified Senate building
IN the aftermath of the U.S. raid that killed arch-terrorist Osama bin Laden on May 2nd, the United States’ relationship with Pakistan, and what both sides hope to or can accomplish through it, has come under increased scrutiny.
On one hand, the often corrupt and largely ineffective central government has attempted slow reform with varied success. On the other, radical extremist groups flourish as an exploding youth population yearns for structure that a government in perpetual flux has not been able to offer.
According to a Gallup poll shortly after the raid, 31% of Pakistanis believed that their intelligence service knew of bin Laden’s location and 65% said the United States could not have conducted the raid without Pakistani intelligence being aware. Another poll by YouGov found that roughly two-thirds of Pakistanis believed the United States did not kill bin Laden in Abbottabad.
Such data points to a sizeable distrust of government statements, even more disbelief in the United States, and a resilient faith in the power of the security apparatus. Under these circumstances, we must examine the social, political and economic well-being of the state. What constitutes its structures is up for considerable debate, making the path to solutions to generation-long problems all the more turbulent.
Turmoil and Change Within the State
Since its founding, Pakistan has more often than not been embroiled in some level of political and social turmoil. Internal ethnic rivalries are strong. Portions of the country, like the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, are nearly ungoverned. Among its more than 180 million citizens, conflicting notions of what constitutes Pakistan’s identity are widespread.
One common ground in Pakistan is Islam, which plays a significant role throughout the country. Most population segments, including a large majority of Pakistan’s youth, define themselves as strictly or moderately observant. Like other typically common definitional standards, there is little agreement on what kind of Islam should dominate Pakistan. Here again, the lines are often drawn along ethnic boundaries.
Like other “youth bubble” developing nations, Pakistan has witnessed a rapid transition from a rural society to one with poverty stricken masses residing in megacities. The urban population has expanded from just over 20% in 1960 to around 40% today, a trend likely to continue. Movement to the cities has thrown previously disparate ethnic groups into each other’s backyards. This change in how Pakistanis live has facilitated quicker access to information as well as mobilization opportunities, but it has also created tempestuous ideological mixes.
The youth of Pakistan are inheriting a state with a broken education system featuring indicators like literacy stalling or moving in the wrong direction. Prospects are bleak given the economic and demographic outlook combined with current infrastructure, while large portions of the population remain unengaged with the issues that affect them the most. Yet there is good news: opportunity has recently grown in segments like private (mainly non-religious) schooling, where raw building numbers are now on par with public places of learning.
A Government in Perpetual Flux
Today, the Pakistan Peoples Party leads a coalition government in something resembling a struggling democracy, following transition from what many describe as a military – if also reform-minded – dictatorship under General Pervez Musharraf. Though governed by civilian leaders for the past several years, the Pakistani military establishment largely dictates security policy, and the populace looks to it as the arbiter of Pakistan’s survival.
Pakistan has made measured progress in liberalizing. President Asif Ali Zardari, while widely viewed as corrupt, enacted significant changes to the Pakistani constitution after taking power, for instance relinquishing powers to his Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, in a return to the ideals of the 1973 constitution, which featured the elected head as the actual civilian leader of the state.
A growing media – including over 80 TV stations, many in English, in addition to new media entrepreneurs – has been an emergent if debatable “bright” spot over the course of the last decade. But Pakistan has also ranked as one of the most dangerous places for media professionals in the world since 2005. While portions of the media have been accused of pandering to the government, or to the extremists, it remains a force in creating space for budding democratic norms.
Long-and-short term instability continue to wreak havoc on political institutions. Assassinations, including the murder of Salman Taseer, governor of Punjab Province and outspoken critic of archaic blasphemy laws, will undoubtedly dissuade similar reformers from taking a stand. Follow-on protests in support of the assassin are a concerning sign of the difficulties involved in changing a problematic system.
Reassuringly, however, today’s civilian government has thus far been able to weather both natural (major flooding displacing more than 20 million Pakistanis in 2010) and manmade (continual terrorist attacks by extremists within) calamities with at least a hearty modicum of professionalism and without the military intervention that has been a constant undercurrent in Pakistani politics.
Finally, of importance for the future of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, despite the Pakistani public being deeply rooted in Islamic ideals and having perhaps some preference for an Islamic state, is a tendency for the masses to back secular leaders. The Pakistan Peoples Party and other top political outfits in the country often form around national, regional and ethnic issues rather than religious ones.
The Economy Problem
Bolstered by removal of U.S. sanctions, accompanied by private sector development and investment from abroad, much of the 2000s featured strong economic growth with GDP rising to a record level of more than 7% yearly in 2004 and 2005. Following the global recession, this measure tanked before flat-lining below a “safe” point to adequately address Pakistan’s needs. Under the best circumstances, it is likely to be years before Pakistan can regain GDP growth that will allow it to fully sustain itself, let alone put it solidly on the path toward prosperity.
At the same time, both inflation (high even during periods of prosperity) and unemployment have soared, leaving many Pakistanis with less spending power and lower prospects of attaining greater spending power in the near future. Annual per capita GDP, also climbing prior to the recession, is now running below regional competitor states such as Bangladesh, with no major signs of moving upward without massive restructuring of the socio-economic sphere.
With a labor force near 60 million people – doubled since 1990 – the current indicators combined with meager short-term prospects are troubling. While analysts have found the linkage between poverty and extremism to be weak, a growing number of citizens without jobs, or the prospect of jobs, may become further angered with the current trajectory of Pakistan.
Strongly positive signals in the immediate future of Pakistan’s economic health are not numerous, and a historical aversion to proportionally taxing its wealthiest citizens who have the most to give will undoubtedly make progress more difficult. Avenues for the United States to bolster the Pakistani economy include, but are not limited to: increasing trade in industries such as textiles, lowering or removing tariffs on said industries, and increasing focus on private sector development.
Sunrise or Sunset?
A recent Pew public opinion poll sampling Pakistani attitudes toward the United States showed an 11% favorability rating. This is a decline from a high of 27% in 2006 and about on par with the period immediately following September 11, when U.S. engagement with Pakistan became much more significant.
Despite U.S. aid contributions being greater than any other nation and the fact that aid has given boosts to over-stressed sectors like energy, Pakistanis are not happy with the relationship. Given the course of the war against al Qaeda and affiliated organizations, and that Pakistan comes up again and again, the same can likely be said about American views toward Pakistan.
Yet, it is in both the interests of the West and of Pakistan that a stable state continues to emerge in the coming years. How much the United States can do directly to impact Pakistan’s future is unknowable. Aid, while having some meaningful impact, is not the ultimate answer. Pakistan must stand on its own feet.
The overall outlook is perhaps somewhat grim, but our Pakistani partners deserve credit as noted in just a handful of useful examples above. It is worth remembering that Pakistan is fighting the fight. Over 8,000 civilians have been killed by extremists since the beginning of 2009, with many more injured. The military is also losing hundreds of men per year combating terrorism in its own backyard. Though the security of the state is in peril, with Taliban and other extremist sanctuaries still solidly planted and Pakistani commitment to destroying the networks somewhat lacking, the state marches on. While maybe it should be, Pakistan is probably not any closer to collapse now than before economic and security outlooks turned bleaker in 2007 and 2008. ■
