Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August, 2010
Not quite ready to walk in off the street.
I HAVE long advocated for the use of local personnel and companies in stability operations. There are enormous advantages to the larger mission including economic stimulation, technical capacity building and cost savings. It is also worth highlighting the fact that companies in our Contingency Contracting Industry prefer to use local personnel and subcontractors for practical reasons including, again, cost savings, knowledge of local languages, street smarts and more. In short, working with locals offers international contractors a competitive edge over their rivals. In recent years the U.S. Congress grasped this concept and has made requirements that contingency contractors working U.S. contracts in Afghanistan utilize local Afghan companies as much as possible. Now they are recognizing there are inevitable trade-offs with this course of action.
Taxpayers in donor nations benefit from the utilization of locals in contingency operations, and the industry benefits from the expertise of local subcontractors, so what’s not to like? Unfortunately, a number of drawbacks to local services have made the news of late: stories of local contractors providing substandard services, cutting corners, employing shoddy equipment and under-trained personnel, being under the control of powerful warlords, or even paying the enemy to facilitate safe passage for convoys. These stories have focused particularly on local Afghan private security companies (PSCs).
Specifically, Afghan PSCs contracted to escort NATO supply and reconstruction convoys are alleged to be undisciplined and under-supervised, using lethal force indiscriminately and even paying the Taliban not to attack. It is claimed the local Afghan PSCs do little if any vetting or training of their personnel, and that they do only the most basic instruction on weapons and training on the limits to the use of force. The realities of working with local companies – often in underdeveloped countries – can be harsh and the problems can be difficult to address. In Afghanistan contract management, reporting and oversight problems are amplified due to widespread illiteracy, an engrained warlord structure and complex political motivations that actively undermine attempts to address the deficiencies. There is the unfortunate assumption that local companies are somewhat less professional and capable than Western companies, but even still, there can be a very fuzzy line between “good enough” and “unacceptable.”
Reports, audits and inspections are onerous and time consuming for international contractors, but they are a normal part of the unique contingency contracting industry. Lawmakers and taxpayers have a right to know their funds are being used appropriately. Since there are so many advantages to having local staff capable of doing these tasks, it is therefore quite normal to see local nationals being trained by international companies on the skills necessary to operate and manage contracts to Western standards. However, for Afghan companies in a virtually computer-less industry, normal oversight and reporting requirements can be completely overwhelming. Sometimes Afghan companies will have Western partners that help with paperwork and reporting, or some will work with nongovernmental organizations that help them improve their business practices to a point where international clients are confident in their abilities. But we need to recognize that local companies are not going to have the same standards and capabilities as foreign companies overnight.
As a result, Western contract managers in the field attempting to carry out international policies are confronted with the conflicting directives from above to use more local companies and at the same time to ensure meticulous oversight and reporting.
Even more challenging, in many cases there are politically compelling reasons for using a particular local company, requirements that may trump the need for proficient contract compliance, transparency and accountability. In the recent Congressional hearings on the topic, panelists made the point that thirty years ago the Soviet army discovered the hard way that, when moving convoys in Afghanistan, paying off local warlords was far cheaper in blood and treasure than defending themselves with brute force. And others made the observation that in Afghanistan, not paying warlords for protection and safe passage could have the reasonably detrimental effect of turning the warlords and their militias into the enemy. All of which means there is more to choosing local contractors than arithmetic or capability.
Closer government oversight is not necessarily the easy, go-to option either. Some have suggested that American contract management personnel simply need to get “outside of the wire” of their bases, proposing that a U.S. Contract Officer Representative (COR) accompany every truck convoy. However, Westerners are targets themselves, and such a practice would increase the target value of the truck convoys to the Taliban and thus necessitate the need for significantly heavier security for all convoys.
A better option might be to work with Western contractors who have the prime contract positions and are thus responsible for all their subcontractors’ compliance. Many industry companies operate with a very low profile, enabling them to discreetly do effective oversight and management of their subcontractors. Oversight does not have to be done by Western citizens and certainly does not have to be done by government officials who are themselves a target. Ultimately, it is far easier, safer and more effective for the government agencies to monitor the prime contractor and hold them accountable for the effectiveness and professionalism of their subcontractors.
All contractors, Western or local, are beholden to the needs and requirements of their clients. Clients set standards, quality levels, vetting requirements, performance benchmarks, timetables and reporting requirements. No one expects local companies to always have the necessary capabilities, but clients are right to insist that local companies ultimately develop such expertise.
What is clear is that cutting Afghan companies out of the process is not a wise or realistic option. If local companies can prove they have the professionalism and capabilities to carry out a task and provide necessary transparency, then they are an ideal option for all the right reasons. In far more cases it may make more sense to let proven and accountable international companies handle the management and oversight of subcontracted local firms, an option that reduces the risk and saves money for the governments carrying out the policies.
Contingency contracting is inherently chaotic, and it is absurd to expect these missions to run without a hitch – there will always be some aspect that can and will be criticized with greater or lesser justification. Nevertheless, there is much that can be done to improve the quality and professionalism of the contracting and thus enhance the chances of success for the larger mission and policy. Finding ways to ensure effective use of local personnel and firms in Afghanistan – or in any peacekeeping or stability operation – is vital to ultimate success.
