Jul 012010
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 - July/August, 2010
Ethnic Uzbeks fleeing violence in Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
CHAMPIONED as an “island of democracy” in 1990s, invoking the country’s embrace of liberal democracy and free market economy, Kyrgyzstan today verges on becoming an island of chaos with a potential to destabilize the region. Indeed, in the wake of two violent government overthrows within a five-year period and further bloody massacres in the country’s south this June, the current interim government’s failure to establish legitimacy and rule of law could have dire consequences.
When the 2005 Tulip Revolution replaced the 15-year rule of Askar Akaev with Kurmanbek Bakiev, the impoverished country of 5 million looked at the change with immense hope. Bakiev promised to end the long-standing family-run governance, cronyism and corruption, and boost freedom of press and speech; but his actions reinforced the worst qualities of Akaev’s presidency. By any measure, living standards and basic freedoms have rapidly deteriorated since 2005. The Bakiev government’s decision to increase energy and telecommunications prices in early 2010 led to spontaneous angry protests that took a violent climax on April 7 when a bloody riot ended with 87 deaths and over a thousand wounded unarmed civilians.
Although the lootings and vandalism following the violence were lesser in scale compared to the aftermath of the 2005 revolution, chaos swept through government and parliament buildings, the commercial sector and a television station. Kyrgyz law enforcement was demoralized and absent the night of the government overthrow. Ordinary citizens and businesses demonstrated that they were (and still are) ready to use force to protect property, particularly when illegal land grabs began in and around the capital, Bishkek. People gathered to form volunteer vigilante groups to provide for public order and protection of private property. Such groups still remain in force, as evidenced by signs displayed in shops around Bishkek. Not a single looter is punished yet, according to local press reports.
The post-Bakiev lull was shattered on June 10, when armed militia began attacking ordinary citizens in Osh and Jalal Abad provinces in Kyrgyzstan’s south, reportedly with the intention of stoking an inter-ethnic conflict between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. These events were preceded by inter-ethnic clashes in Jalal-Abad on April 13-14, 2010 and may divide the country into North and South. According to official accounts, the latest violence claimed over 191 lives, but the real numbers could be a lot higher. With over 1,000 injured, this disaster creates a massive refugee and humanitarian crises. The U.N.’s latest estimates show the refugee figures at 400,000, with thousands of Uzbeks fleeing to neighboring Uzbekistan.
The violence has appeared distinctly ethnic-based, with attacks and killings aimed primarily at Uzbeks, which constitute about 30 percent of southern Kyrgyzstan. However, many Kyrgyz residents in the conflict zone fled as well, reportedly because the killings were aimed indiscriminately against both the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. While relations between the two ethnic groups have been tense for many years due to disagreements over resource distribution and political representation ― particularly after a brief but bloody conflict in 1990 ― the massacres were apparently premeditated and carried out by a third party to deliberately fuel a conflict in advance of a constitutional referendum scheduled for June 27. Kyrgyz authorities claim that the Bakiev family, specifically the former president’s son Maksim, is behind the violence: A tapped phone conversation allegedly between Maksim and Janysh details plans to destabilize the country in an effort to regain power.
The post-Bakiev environment has been conducive to provocations and instability due to the resultant power vacuum and political wrangling. Since Bakiev’s ousting in April, both the public and politicians have been divided in their views on a new draft of the constitution, which aims to change the existing presidential system to a parliamentary structure after a constitutional referendum. According to the new version of the constitution, the state and the political system would no longer be concentrated in the hands of a president, and mechanisms to balance the power of the deputies of parliament would be strengthened. However, while many believe that the presidential system contributed to the current dangerous political deadlock, many others are concerned that a new system would still carry over long-standing problems such as cronyism, corruption and the rule of a small elite.
A critical issue remains the weakness of the interim government, which is now even more unpopular in the wake of its complete failure to stop the killings in the south and in turn preventing the refugee and humanitarian disaster. Prior to the latest crisis, the legitimacy of the interim government became increasingly questionable with the publication of incriminating tapped phone conversations between key members revealed counter-revolution plans and divisions of government positions. Because of diverging positions and a power struggle among members, there is no clear consolidation or unity within the current power structure. This was evidenced by a statement of Almaz Atambayev, interim Deputy Prime Minister, implicating a first deputy, Azimbek Beknazarov, and acting Finance Minister, Temir Sariev, in the illegal use of public funds; Beknazarov in turn accused Atambayev for selling a top customs position. The fact that the current government includes individuals both from the Akaev and Bakiev teams only exacerbates the potential for instability.
Taped phone conversations have exposed many other politicians’ behind-the-scenes involvement in fomenting instability in order to gain power. A case in point is a leader of the Communist Party, Iskhak Masaliev, who was part of the parliamentary committee on constitutional legislation. Despite telling a Bishkek newspaper of his desire to normalize the situation in Kyrgyzstan and expressing his readiness to do anything for stability, the leak of a recorded phone conversation demonstrated his direct connection in coordinating protests in southern Kyrgyzstan to garner support for his election as a speaker of the parliament, which would ultimately pave a way for Masaliev to act as the country’s president in line with the current constitution. The dynamic and changing political situation, and inconsistent positions of power players leaves the country’s future uncertain.
Compounding the country’s problems is widespread and growing criminality. With rising fissures within the interim government and weak morale in law enforcement structures, a sense of lawlessness has arisen, and criminal forces are now vying for spheres of influence. According to a member of the interim government, Emilbek Kaptagaev, the country’s General Directorate of Criminal Investigation has also been closely linked with organized crime and any effort to change the system would be met with firm resistance to protect current positions. There is a great danger that this power vacuum and the lack of the rule of law will embolden criminal elements in the country seeking to take advantage of the situation, with their ultimate aim being to insinuate themselves into the political structure. The country witnessed a similar development after the 2005 Tulip Revolution, which brought to light a close connection between the state and criminal underground. Many in Kyrgyzstan claim that the latest violence in the south was carried out by Kyrgyz criminals and mercenaries. At least one source, Kadir Malikov, director of Bishkek-based research group Religion Law and Politics, argues that the Bakiev family hired volunteers to kill, including some from Afghanistan linked to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
Kyrgyzstan’s increased political and ethnic drama may also have regional ramifications if it spills over into neighboring countries. Further, there is concern that it could undermine NATO’s military mission in Afghanistan, which relies on the Manas airbase at the outskirts of Bishkek for the transit of military and humanitarian support. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan sealed the borders with Kyrgyzstan for almost two months after Bakiev’s ouster, thereby severely disrupting bilateral trade and movement of people. Kazakhstan decided to open the country’s border with Kyrgyzstan only after the latter pressured to cut water supplies and food imports upon which Kazakhstan relies. However, more border closures, with ensuing cross-border problems, are not ruled out if Kyrgyzstan continues to stay unstable.
The American presence in Kyrgyzstan has also been central to the nation’s politics. The United States heavily invested in the Manas airbase in order to support its mission in Afghanistan. While the interim government assured its contract sanctity with the United States to keep the military airbase in Kyrgyzstan, the lack of certainty about the stability of the divided current government and diverging viewpoints on foreign policy cast doubt on the long-term future of the airbase. The interim government views the U.S. with skepticism, in light of the belief that the country conveniently turned a blind eye to president Bakiev’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies in the interests of continuing to use the airbase. This feeling prompted Washington to give significant focus to its diplomacy with Bishkek in the wake of the events of April 7. There are voices in Kyrgyz political circles arguing that the relations with the United States should be improved and the airbase should stay given the base’s financial benefits to the country. Thus, the United States has a window of opportunity to improve its image in the country by more actively helping to cope with the crisis in the south and supporting the democratic process.
Russia, too, is a major external player in Kyrgyzstan’s future. Given Russia’s ability to wield its influence on Kyrgyzstan, as evidenced by the affect its open displeasure and critical media coverage had on his ouster, its influence over the country cannot be underestimated. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan’s comparative weakness, along with its economic and political dependence on Russia will likely mean that Russia’s influence will only grow. The latest crises in Osh and Jalal Abad demonstrated Kyrgyzstan’s lack of preparedness to defend itself and its citizens from violence, prompting the interim government to ask for Russia’s military intervention to stop the bloodshed (a request that was denied). Kyrgyzstan’s dependence on Russia and its neighbors is expected to grow further as it deals with an enormous humanitarian and refugee crisis, ethnic animosity, economic setback and criminal forces.
While external actors may not dictate the outcome of internal dynamics in Kyrgyzstan, they have the ability to usher its direction, as the country finds itself at a crucial crossroads in its survival.
