Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August 2010
Painting a picture of lessons learned from Iraq
FROM the Balkans to Baghdad, the United States has repeatedly deployed civilian and military assets to execute stabilization and reconstruction operations over the past two decades. But the mixed results of these endeavors reveal that the U.S. government has not yet found a successful approach to effectively managing such interagency assistance operations.
Over the past six years, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has published more than 350 reports, documenting every facet of the Iraq reconstruction program. In the course of doing so, SIGIR has developed an extensive catalogue of lessons learned, many of which are applicable to current and future stabilization and reconstruction operations. Foremost among these lessons is that the United States lacks an integrated management office to plan and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations, thwarting unity of command and inhibiting unity of effort.
To fill this gap, SIGIR has proposed the creation of the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO) to plan and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. Working closely with the Chief of Mission, the USAID mission director and the military commanders, USOCO’s director would manage all stabilization and reconstruction efforts for the life of the stabilization or reconstruction operation.
Stabilization and reconstruction operations are a distinct “middle” step — both in time and in nature — that occur between the active military intervention and the longer-term development activities that are traditionally the mainstay of USAID. SIGIR has used the term “the fourth D” to describe these efforts (as they are neither defense, development, or diplomacy) but in fact a fourth element that has yet to be clearly defined, and that has elements of the prior three, but is unique and would become the purview of this new entity.
USOCO’s operations would be informed by a set of core principles drawn from lessons learned in previous stabilization and reconstruction operations, including:
1. Restoring security before engaging in Large Scale Reconstruction
Establishing security means more than ensuring the absence of violence. The long-term success of any stability and reconstruction operation depends not only on securing the population, but also on developing sustainable rule-of-law institutions such as a corruption-free judiciary, an effective anticorruption office and a capable police force.
2. Fit Reconstruction Strategies To Match Host-Country Capacities
Infrastructure reconstruction programs must consider local conditions, capabilities and contexts. In the early stages of the Iraq planning effort, a decision was made to build state-of-the-art capital projects, as opposed to those that would match local operating capacities and support systems. Too often, this strategy led to failure.
3. Prioritize “Soft” Programs
The Iraq experience teaches that initiatives to develop the capacity of people and governmental systems (“soft” programs) are as important as “bricks-and-mortar” projects. The early years of the reconstruction effort largely ignored the lessons of other post-conflict experiences by failing to prioritize the soft programs needed to build and sustain a modern bureaucratic state. Absent of a skilled cadre of professional managers, even the best projects will fall short of expectations.
4. Coordinate U.S. Government Efforts with the Contractor Community
SIGIR has published scores of audits detailing the U.S. government’s evolving relationship with government contractors. Oftentimes, these reports identified serious management and oversight gaps. For example, in 2009 SIGIR looked at the coordination and management of private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq, finding that U.S. government agencies lacked uniform policies and procedures to manage, oversee and report on PSC operations.[1] Acting on SIGIR’s recommendations, their oversight, coordination and control of PSC activities in Iraq has been strengthened, if ad hoc in nature. The creation of an integrated entity responsible for managing stability or reconstruction operations would provide contractors operating in a contingency environment with a single point of contact, thereby simplifying reporting responsibilities and improving coordination.
5. Engage the International Community from the Outset
Effectively coordinating and harmonizing international resources and expertise can further U.S. interests in a stability or reconstruction operation. Therefore, the global community should be included in stability and reconstruction operations planning from the outset.
6. Base Reconstruction Decisions on Accurate, Timely and Complete Information
Time and again, course changes in Iraq reconstruction policy wasted considerable resources. The fundamental decisions on what to do, how much to do and where to do it were repeatedly altered during the reconstruction program. For future operations, a comprehensive project-reporting system should, at a minimum, follow standardized output formats and common update cycles and should consider longer-term horizons.
7. Create a Single SRO Funding Source
Creating a single decision-making structure responsible for prioritizing the use of consolidated stability and reconstruction operations funds would focus responsibility for project selection and management in one entity and establish accountability for theater-wide SRO outcomes.
USOCO
The Iraq reconstruction effort began with inadequately resourced management structures that were incapable of effectively executing the unprecedented effort. Staffed primarily by temporary employees serving short tours, the Coalition Provisional Authority operated against the backdrop of a deteriorating security situation. It confronted an array of challenges for which it was ill-prepared. Its decisions were too often driven by ever-changing circumstances, while the unstable security environment impeded progress on all fronts.
Notwithstanding these painful realities, many aspects of which were perhaps unavoidable, a well-developed stability and reconstruction operations plan with a sufficiently robust interagency management office could have anticipated some of the problems and implemented program adjustments, averting the waste of hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars. The most salient lesson from Iraq is that the United States did not have a single point of accountability and responsibility for executing what became the two most expansive stability and reconstruction operations (including Afghanistan) in U.S. history. That problem persists to this day. USOCO could solve it.
Upon creation by the Congress, USOCO would become the locus for planning, funding, staffing and managing stability and reconstruction operations, replacing the fragmented process that now exists. Importantly, USOCO would provide a single office whose sole mission is ensuring that the United States is prepared for the next contingency operation. It would be operational, and heavily focused in the field.
At its heart, the USOCO proposal does not call for creating an entirely new organization. Instead, USOCO would bring together under one roof varied mission elements, now spread amongst the interagency community, including the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, various Department of Defense programs and offices established under Stability Operations guidance, the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives.
Key senior leadership positions within USOCO would include:
- A Director and three Deputy Directors, who would be a presidential appointment requiring Senate confirmation;
- Permanent staff, supplementing the full-time staff with detailees from relevant agencies and judicious use of contractors.
- Embedded Field Operatives, where groups of USOCO personnel would be positioned within Combatant Commands to work with the military on stability and reconstruction operation planning and with the U.S. Embassy to coordinate through the Chief of Mission.
- Surge personnel, so that in the event of a declared stability or reconstruction operations, the pre-positioned field cells would be reinforced with deployable elements drawn from permanent USOCO personnel as well as “ready reserve” experts from other federal departments and contractors.
Without a modest institution dedicated to this mission, there is no place in the U.S. government where individuals with the necessary skills and abilities to carry out unique civilian-military tasks in a stability or reconstruction operation can thrive, nor is there a location in government where assessments can be made, where best practices can be housed and developed, or where accountability can finally be achieved.
Since 2001, the United States has committed more than $100 billion — and more than 6,500 soldiers’ and civilians’ lives — to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. In a time of severe financial constraints, the U.S. government should implement reforms that learn from and apply the lessons of Iraq to reduce waste and improve economy, efficiency and effectiveness. By establishing USOCO, the Congress would take a tangible and enduring step toward institutionalizing what was learned in Iraq and ensuring that the United States is better prepared for the crises of tomorrow.
Endnotes
[1] SIGIR Audits 09-019 and 09-022.
