Ian M. Ralby

Nov 012011

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 3 – November-December, 2011

Private security guard stands alert and ready

OF the 166 companies that, at the time of writing, have signed the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (“ICoC” or “the Code”), at least two-thirds engage in maritime security services.  Indeed, roughly one-third provide exclusively maritime security services.  This significant uptake among such companies has raised questions and concerns as to whether the ICoC is actually applicable and adequate for maritime operations.

At the moment, the ICoC does not cover private security operations on the high seas.   Paragraph 13 establishes that the Code is “applicable to the actions of Signatory Companies while performing Security Services in Complex Environments.”   According to the definition provided in the Code, “Complex Environments” are “any areas experiencing or recovering from unrest or instability, whether due to natural disasters or armed conflicts, where the rule of law has been substantially undermined, and in which the capacity of the state authority to handle the situation is diminished, limited, or non-existent.”.  The word “and” in this definition excludes maritime security operations.  The high seas are not under the authority of any state, yet the definition of a complex environment assumes the locus of activity to be within the territory of a sovereign country.  The high seas, therefore, fall outside the coverage of the ICoC, meaning that maritime security operations, at best, have an unclear and confusing place under the Code given that some of their operations are in territorial waters and thus might fall within a “complex environment.”

Sep 012010
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 2 – September/October, 2010

Somali Pirates

A formidable opponent.

Throughout Africa, incongruous pockets of naval capability exist without the capacity to actually deliver desperately needed maritime security. There are well-trained naval personnel without ships or boats, and highly sophisticated pieces of land-based equipment without operators or even the generators to power them. Since earmarked funding packages from African nations’ defense budgets and donor nation assistance programs provide logistical support, equipment or training, little attention is paid to comprehensive needs. Donors rarely consider sustainability and consistency in operational support when addressing the growing problem of maritime security all around the continent.

In the developing world, where pressing problemsof national interest, such as food security, infrastructure development and education arealready competing for funding, it is no surprise that many African governments struggle and indeed balk at deciding whether to fund maritime security. When it comes to allocation of funding, especially for African nations facing major developmental challenges, maritime security simply is not a priority.

Corruption erodes what little political will there is to confront obvious systemic challenges, much less maritime security. When that deficit of will is combined with donor nations’ general lack of understanding the complex challenges of prioritized spending in Africa, it is easy to see why gaps appear in donor-funded initiatives. The lack of established functional and effective maritime security and law enforcement, however, is a gap that can no longer be ignored or delayed.

Jan 012010

Journal of International Peace
Volume 5, Number 4, January – February 2010

OVER half of the private security companies (PSCs) in Sierra Leone are operating without licenses and are therefore outside the law. Significant problems, particularly labor issues, plague the entire industry and impinge on the overall security of the post-conflict state. While there are some exceptions to the wide-spread problems, the principle cause for optimism comes from Sierra Leone’s active participation in the Montreux Process, combined with redoubled efforts on the part of the Office of National Security (ONS) — the organ of the Sierra Leone government that oversees PSCs — to close down illegal PSCs and more stringently regulate legal ones.

Since 2002, the National Security and Central Intelligence Act has required all private security companies in Sierra Leone to register with ONS. ONS, in turn, reviews the applications and issues licenses to the PSCs it deems competent to operate security businesses. According to Francis Keili of ONS, who is responsible for the oversight of the private security sector, there were 25 to 30 licensed PSCs in Sierra Leone in November 2009. Estimates consistently suggest, however, that there were between 50 and 60 PSCs in operation.

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