Stuart Bowen, Jr.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 1 – July/August 2010
Painting a picture of lessons learned from Iraq
FROM the Balkans to Baghdad, the United States has repeatedly deployed civilian and military assets to execute stabilization and reconstruction operations over the past two decades. But the mixed results of these endeavors reveal that the U.S. government has not yet found a successful approach to effectively managing such interagency assistance operations.
Over the past six years, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has published more than 350 reports, documenting every facet of the Iraq reconstruction program. In the course of doing so, SIGIR has developed an extensive catalogue of lessons learned, many of which are applicable to current and future stabilization and reconstruction operations. Foremost among these lessons is that the United States lacks an integrated management office to plan and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations, thwarting unity of command and inhibiting unity of effort.
To fill this gap, SIGIR has proposed the creation of the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO) to plan and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. Working closely with the Chief of Mission, the USAID mission director and the military commanders, USOCO’s director would manage all stabilization and reconstruction efforts for the life of the stabilization or reconstruction operation.
