Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 4 – January-February, 2012

The role of the private sector in the future of Iraq

Much media attention has accompanied the end of the U.S. military presence in Iraq, as well as the reality that thousands of contractors will remain behind.  Not surprisingly, too many commentators are referring to an ‘army’ of contractors – terminology which may make their articles a more compelling read, but also provides an unfortunate mischaracterization of the civilian reality. Oddly, some almost appear to be arguing for a ‘remilitarization’ of the mission, something clearly rejected by the Iraqis themselves.

Although the scale is necessarily large, the private firms working in support of the diplomatic mission are undertaking tasks that are not so unusual for private firms in more benign environments.  Contractors are conducting logistics, facilities management, medical evacuation and many different kinds of training.  Yes, many are providing site security and body guard services as well, defensive, protective roles as is common domestically in the West.  While this unique operation with international policy implications should indeed be covered by the media, the sensationalization is unhelpful to the public.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 3 – November-December, 2011

TEN years ago, private firms specializing in stability operations were not recognized as part of a larger, established industry.  Nevertheless, hundreds of contractors were working in the field supporting various UN and West African peacekeeping operations with logistics, aviation, construction, and security.  Other companies were professionalizing militaries, training police, building refugee camps, and providing large scale logistics in the Balkans.  With endless examples over the ages, the role of the private sector in these kinds of operations is hardly new, but increased international reliance on such services necessitated a united consortium to address issues arising in the industry.  Several compelling factors spurred the coalescing of the industry to the point where an association became an increasingly useful resource.

Perhaps the most compelling factor was an interest expressed by the more seasoned and professional companies within the nascent industry in differentiating their experience and quality from the rest. Clients, especially governments, are notorious for ignoring quality, professionalism, and capability, instead focusing solely on lowest price.  Vital international policies, particularly those related to humanitarian concerns, should be important enough to emphasize experience and quality over short-term costs to ensure that these missions succeed.  The reality is that nonsensical short-term savings efforts undermine better companies and proposals, and are the bane of our industry — and of successful missions. ISOA addresses that issue and educates governments and other clients on the value of quality in contingency operations.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 2 – September-October, 2011

IN July I travelled to Kabul to see how ISOA might address several issues that are plaguing our Member companies working in support of the international effort in Afghanistan. First, the Afghan government is requiring taxes from Western-funded companies for projects that should be tax-exempt; the second issue is the viability of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) which is optimistically planned to be fully operational and replacing Private Security Companies in just a few months.

In short, the dispute over when companies are tax exempt is directly undermining Western efforts for a stable Afghanistan; and few experts have any confidence that the APPF will be capable of replacing tens of thousands of security contractors which could leave infrastructure, foreign experts and thousands of reconstruction sites highly vulnerable.  With no change in these two situations, ultimate policy success may be unlikely in the face of so many impediments.

Compared to my previous visit to Afghanistan in 2006, I encountered significantly less optimism among the Afghan and Westerners serving the mission.  Some considerable improvements in the mission are necessary if we hope that Afghanistan will be truly operating and standing independently by 2014.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 1 – July-August, 2011

A recent article in The New Yorker raised the ugly issue of labor trafficking in contingency operations.  The article mentions food riots, illegal payments to recruiters of Third Country Nationals (TCNs), and deceptive practices used to trick employees into operating in war zones. Although this is far from a new problem, it has never been comprehensively addressed and violations undermine the legitimacy and accomplishments of the mission itself.  Too often the issue is ignored by governments in the face of more pressing conflict-related problems, or simply due to the pressure to obtain the very lowest price from their contractors.

TCNs come from all over the world and they add enormous capability and value to contingency operations.  No international stability policy could succeed without the cost-effective labor, expertise and off-the-shelf experience TCNs bring to the field.  In fact, employing local hires is by far the best value and offers vast economic and capacity- building benefits. Sometimes, however, necessary skill sets are unavailable or vetting locals is an issue, and the problem of insurgent infiltration means that clients prefer that employees hail from neutral places, i.e., third countries.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 6 – May-June, 2011

The Afghan Ministry of Finance – in direct contravention of existing legal agreements – insists on sending tax bills to businesses operating in Afghanistan under U.S. Government contracts. While clearly a vexing issue, even more troubling is the fact that the U.S. Department of State refuses to raise, much less resolve, this issue with their Afghan counterparts.

Carefully negotiated agreements between coalition governments and the Government of Afghanistan specify that non-Afghan contractors that support the stability and reconstruction missions are not subject to Afghan taxation. This exemption is completely sensible, as the Afghan Government and its people are the ultimate beneficiaries of partner-funded, contractor-provided assistance; in the United States, Congress would certainly be incensed – particularly at a time of an especially tight budget – if foreign governments dare to charge the American taxpayer for providing foreign aid.  Nevertheless, the Afghan Ministry of Finance has repeatedly submitted tax bills that are not allowed under government-to-government agreements and that frequently indicate inflated, arbitrary, or even fraudulent tax rates to companies providing such aid. An additional complication is that Afghan officials have indicated the intent to withhold work permits if the companies refuse to pay the illicit taxes.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 5 – March-April, 2011

Late 2000 saw contractors holding together the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. Of course, 17,000 blue helmets from around the world were also contributing to the largest U.N. operation in the world at that point, but their forces had been routed in May 2000 by a handful of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) insurgents — essentially teenagers with no political aspirations who amounted to little more than a bloodthirsty street gang. The U.N. forces were ultimately rescued by a handful of highly professional British soldiers who then stayed on to keep the RUF rebels in check with judicious and appropriate use of force until the country and U.N. mission could stabilize. Even then, with a massive international presence in the tiny country, it was the private sector — hundreds of Sierra Leoneans working for contractors — that provided the actual logistics, construction and support services for the mission.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 4 – January-February, 2011

Hailed as one of the most effective U.S. training programs to date, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program has been in operation in Africa for eight years.  ACOTA, run by the Department of State, praised by many in Congress, and conducted by private contractors working in cooperation with U.S. military officers, has trained more than 100,000 African peacekeepers in skills that have been put to good use in international peacekeeping missions in places like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and even in the remarkably difficult and dangerous Africa Union operation ongoing in Mogadishu.

African peacekeepers still require logistics and other support, but they are conducting missions with a level of professionalism and capability that would have been impossible just ten years ago.  The 2003 Liberian intervention in particular has been an unheralded success story of U.S. peacekeeper training in Africa – training largely provided by private contractors.

At a 2003 dinner, IPOA (as ISOA was known at the time) hosted the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, Theresa Whelan who discussed the role of contractors in her Africa operations.  While she emphasized that her increased utilization of contractors was a result of realities of the post-9/11 world where U.S. military personnel who might have completed such tasks in the past were required elsewhere, she highlighted the enormous value and effectiveness that contractors brought to training programs.  Although Whelan stressed the prestige factor related to direct training by uniformed military, especially Special Forces, she noted that contractors ensure excellent quality of training by enlisting retired military or reservists as trainers.

A Welcome to the International Stability Operations Association

Our readers will have already noticed that IPOA has now become the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA), a change that took place at our Annual Summit in October.  The actual name modification may seem small, but the change updates decade-old terminology handed down from the academic world.

“Stability Operations” is more inclusive and representative of the larger industry and it encompasses disaster relief operations such as Haiti and the 2008 tsunami – catastrophes that our industry has had a very significant hand in addressing with their unique sets of services and expeditionary capabilities.  We have also replaced our trademark sleeping lion with a cleaner logo.  The rebranding received a warm welcome from the Summit audience and we look forward to serving our Membership and welcoming new companies as the ISOA.

A Welcome to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers

AT the end of September 2010, the Swiss government hosted a meeting to hammer out a final draft of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC).  The meeting included representatives from a number of private security companies (PSCs), trade associations representing additional PSCs, five governments and civil society.

The association that represents the stability operations industry, formerly called IPOA, is now the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA). The new name and logo are designed to better reflect the broad industry that provides vital services and support to the international community in conflict, post-conflict and disaster relief operations.

“From the beginning, our goal has been to make international stability operations more successful by increasing accountability, ethics and standards within the industry,” said ISOA’s President, Doug Brooks. “For almost ten years we have grown as the ethical core of a unique and valuable international resource. Our new name reflects that evolution as an association and as an industry, and positions us for the future.”

ISOA’s Director, J.J. Messner, unveiled the organization’s new name and logo at the IPOA 2010 Annual Summit in Washington, D.C last week. The change is the result of an association-wide vote and is designed to better represent the broad mission and clientele of the industry as a whole.

The announcement of the ISOA name is part of a progressive effort to ensure the support and participation of all key actors in the Stability Operations Industry, including private firms, non-governmental organizations, and governmental and commercial clients.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 2 – September/October, 2010

In recent press articles and in statements by some elected officials regarding contractors in Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq, one can only be impressed by the spirit of hostility. This is unfortunate for many reasons, not least of which is that contractors are there because we — that is,the international community and humanitarians in general — want them there. The stability operations industry is led by civilians with backgrounds in the very governments and militaries tasked to accomplish the policies designed by the international community. Tens of thousands of local and international personnel, willing to endure the very real risks and hardships involved in running contingency operations, are our partners in implementing these vital international missions in the field. These hostile attitudes are regrettable because critics seem to forget, or deliberately ignore, that the industry has been deployed in these places because the international community really does want and need them to be there if our policies are to succeed.

Misconceptions about the industry — often fuelled by ignorance or deliberate distortion — abound. While expressing shock at the significant numbers of contractors in areas of conflict, few critics or publications bother to mention that most are actually local nationals who should be reconstructing and providing security in their own countries. Cost comparisons between governmental efforts and contractors generally ignore the enormous cost benefits private firms gain by utilizing a local work force, or that better management techniques and flexibility allow for similar capabilities at significantly less cost. Most detractors fail to recognize the reality: that no government or military can replace the capacity and skills the private sector brings to contingency operations. While policy direction absolutely should come from governments, propagating the myth that only governmental personnel and resources should be used for such undertakings is deceptive and harmful.