Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 3 – November-December, 2011
Rebuilding Afghanistan - one airport at a time
THE U.S. government (USG) will probably continue to use a number of private sector contractors to support stability operations overseas, even as military efforts draw down over time. However, whether the USG has taken the experiences of contractors to learn more about contract operations is still up for discussion.
In June, the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) at the National Defense University hosted a unique discussion on private sector stabilization perspectives with a mix of Department of Defense and USAID contractors, and government representatives. Sponsored by ISOA and moderated its president Doug Brooks, and CCO’s senior research fellow David Becker, private sector leaders exchanged ideas for innovations and improvements to USG capacity. The event formed part of CCO’s effort to look at “next generation interventions” post Iraq and Afghanistan.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 3 – November-December, 2011
Co-authored by Chris Mayer and Lisa Hole
Afghan private security forces listen intently
IN August 2011, Part 159 to Chapter 32 of the Federal Code of Regulations (32CFR159) was published in its final form. This final rule, “Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Combat Operations, or Other Significant Military Operations,” applies to all U.S. Government agencies using public funds for contractor-provided security functions at any tier during such operations. Although separate from the Montreux Document Initiative, the provisions of the final rule are entirely consistent with Montreux and promote a consistent, high standard for armed private security providers across the U.S. Government.
It will come as no surprise that governments have relied on the private sector to provide security functions for many years – both in the United States and overseas. Over the last few years, Congress and the media have criticized the U.S. Government for its use and management of private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. What has grabbed the headlines is the inappropriate behavior of PSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and allegations of the U.S. Government’s lack of oversight and control. The media has not been so quick to point out that these PSCs undertake valuable tasks that enable relief, recovery, and reconstruction by protecting the people performing these activities from terrorists and other violent criminals. PSCs often put themselves in harm’s way to protect U.S. Government property and personnel who contribute to a region’s return to stability. The media has also failed to acknowledge the steps that the U.S. Government has taken and continues to take to improve the performance and oversight of PSCs.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 2 – September-October, 2011
USIP: Neither a think tank or an NGO
The United States Institute of Peace is not a think tank, an NGO nor a federal agency but it has a remarkable and valuable niche in international policy. It is unlikely that those who fund USIP, American taxpayers, even know what it is or what it does. So what is the United States Institute of Peace? The simplest answer is that USIP is a conflict management organization. But, in reality, that isn’t a simple answer at all. There is truly nothing simple about USIP and the subject its experts address every day: conflict.
Conflict has been a cornerstone of international relations for decades, while peace persists as the most elusive goal. Both have defined how we think of entire periods in history, and continue to define the relationships between and among governments, communities and people.
When the United States Institute of Peace was chartered in 1984, conflict was widely understood as a simple zero-sum game between well-defined sides. The ever-present East versus West nuclear showdown was applied as the theoretic model and real motivator for stakeholders in the largest of stand-offs and the smallest of outbreaks of violence. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11 terrorist attacks, the only thing that any theorists, think-tanks and practitioners in the field of international relations can agree on is that we are in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 period – whatever that means.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 2 – September-October, 2011
WITH the threat of default on the national debt behind us, most defense policy watchers have returned their gaze to one of the most pressing legislative issues for the defense industry: passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The NDAA authorizes all programs, policies, and funding for the Department of Defense (DoD) and defense-related programs in the Department of Energy. Congress must pass the act annually and no major defense program or funding allocation can be changed, begun, or ended, without this document approving it first.
The often-byzantine process of writing and passing this bill can be bewildering to those not familiar with the intricacies of Congress. However, because it impacts all aspects of the defense industry, it is important to understand how this legislation is crafted and how it will affect the interests of stability operation contractors.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 2 – September-October, 2011
An aerial view of the Pentagon
ROBERT GATES had many goals during his four and a half years as defense secretary, but perhaps his most important was to change the military’s culture in order to conduct peace and stability operations more effectively. Within the Defense Department, Gates aimed to counterbalance what he saw as the Pentagon’s natural tendency to focus excessively on winning conventional conflicts rather than “irregular wars” against terrorists and insurgents, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Within the broader national security community, Gates strived to enhance the non-military instruments of U.S. power, which are often most effective at providing enduring stability to regions in conflict.
The Pentagon developed considerable expertise in fighting guerrillas during the Vietnam War. When the U.S. military role in that conflict ended, however, senior commanders reverted to their longstanding focus on preparing to win major conventional wars in Europe and Asia. This neglect of low-intensity warfare contributed to the difficulties the armed forces experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq when converting initial battlefield victories into an enduring political success. Throughout his years as defense secretary, Gates sought, through his speeches and authoritative defense documents, to institutionalize a more balanced orientation that gives due consideration to fighting irregular as well as conventional wars.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 1 – July-August, 2011
WHEN the words “United States” and “United Nations” are used in the same sentence, it is highly likely that the author is talking about some sort of controversy. This is certainly the case when it comes to America and U.N. peacekeeping operations. Frequently this question is raised: “Is the United States wasting its money?” The goal of this article is not to argue one side or the other , but rather offer a fresh perspective.
First and foremost, the latest survey or “perspective” of the average American should be taken into consideration, since it is their tax money that pays for all U.S. government programs. What are Americans saying about the U.S. military and U.N. peacekeeping? Past surveys have shown a greater willingness to act in certain circumstances if the action is multilateral rather than unilateral. This fact has not changed. The most recent study released in late 2010 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, entitled “Global Views 2010,” shows that 64 percent of Americans favor having a standing U.N. peacekeeping force selected, trained and commanded by the United Nations. Fifty-four percent also think that the United Nations needs to be strengthened. One can respond to this by saying that the average American has almost no say when it comes to U.S. foreign policy, so it is worthwhile to also consider the Obama administration’s official position on U.N. peacekeeping.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 1 – July-August, 2011
The U.S. Army Contracting Command
HAVING viewed various aspects of contracting and acquisition from the vantage point of a retired federal government senior executive, as well as from the client perspective as a consultant, I have gained a wide understanding of the persistent challenges in the process. At a very base level, contracting simply takes too long; although, at the end of the fiscal year, procurements are rushed to meet expiring funds deadlines. Secondly, it is overcomplicated and difficult to understand; thirdly, contract prices always seem high or result in overruns; and fourthly, there is constant debate over what should be “contracted out” versus performed “in-house.” Finally, there is frequent confusion concerning the appropriate role for contractors on the battlefield.
In my opinion, the most significant factors contributing to these problems often originate not from the contracting process itself, but from the nature of contracts as a reflection of the totality of inputs by other parts of the system. I will illustrate this point for each of the concerns outlined above in the following paragraphs.
The Process Takes Too Long
First, why does the contracting process take so long? There are many reasons, including:
- funding is not appropriated in a timely manner;
- offices requiring goods or services do not know how to define their requirements and/or their internal process for submitting procurement requests;
- requirements are subject to political influences;
- contracting offices may not be adequately staffed or trained; and
- many parts of the process, mandated by law or regulation, are designed to allow the maximum number of companies to compete, creating an environment condusive to complaints in the form of protests and appeals.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 6 – May-June, 2011
ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo
Council Resolution 1970 deplores the civilian deaths and systematic human rights violations occurring on the territory of Libya since mid-February this year, as well as the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government. On a number of occasions grad rockets have been reportedly fired into clearly defined civilian areas; military tanks were reported to enter residential areas in cities such as Benghazi and Misrata, among other reported violations.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 6 – May-June, 2011
Sudanese citizens
Before long, Fischer was doing much more than crunch numbers. He helped expand the U.S. government’s reach into rural Southern Sudan, an area the size of France with fewer than 100 miles of paved road. On one occasion, he helped mediate a cattle grazing dispute between two clans, drinking tea with clan leaders and assisting them in planning a dialogue for peace in a situation that could have escalated to regional violence.
Will a change at home make a difference on the ground?
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 5 – March-April, 2011
Released in late 2010, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) put several issues within the Department of State (DoS) under the microscope. One important feature of the QDDR was the light shed on the State Department’s capacity to handle its presidentially-mandated responsibility for post-conflict situations. As such, the QDDR brought attention to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), attention the office had been sorely lacking since its inception. The QDDR promised significant reforms to S/CRS so as to bolster DoS’ capability to manage post-conflict stabilization. It needs to be considered, however, whether the QDDR’s scrutiny of S/CRS will succeed in transforming the neglected office, or if this attention is merely a passing trend. It is possible that renaming the office is enough to ensure that this new focus will successfully strengthen DoS’ aptitude for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. If not, a much greater effort will be needed to realize the QDDR’s vision.
