Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 1 – July-August, 2011

IT was a wonderful day and the view from my “office” at 1,200 feet during a fish survey over Bristol Bay in Alaska was fantastic. Suddenly a voice over the company radio interfered with my peaceful flight. A fishing boat had broken down with a hydraulic system failure and they needed a mechanic and parts immediately. The mechanic and parts had to be picked up in King Salmon, the tools were at a cannery workshop and the final destination was a beach near Egigik, AK. In the days before Technical Advanced Aircrafts (TAA) this scenario required plotting new courses, calculating times and fuel and checking the tide tables to ensure an arrival during low tide and a safe length of runway for landing. This may have been a fairly straightforward mission in a stable, non-conflict area, but a similar project with different requests and destinations could be encountered during stability operations.

In stability operations, logistics and the transport of people and materials are essential functions. On top of the calculations required in this Alaska example, there are different ways to transport these items to the area where they are needed. As stability operations missions often come with a variety of options for air transport, it is necessary to consider how those options, namely different varieties of airplanes and helicopters, suit the requirements of the mission. There are also some general cost and security issues that apply across a variety of missions. The use of aircraft as a means of transport in stability operations is complex and there are particular strengths and weaknesses associated with the use of helicopters versus airplanes in planning and executing safe and effective air operations.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 7, Number 1 – July-August, 2011

A Tsunami of political renewal and reform has struck the “Arab World” over the past several months. And so far, the end is far from sight. An increasing division between rich and poor, privileged and underprivileged, as well as efforts by a new younger generation to shape their own destiny defines the epicenter of this shift. Corruption, massive unemployment rates and outdated political structures only contribute to these tensions, whilst television, information technology and the might of the social networking community have provided the platform to channel the pent up anger.

Although these causes may overlap across revolutions, the reality shows a high degree of complexity in what has been dubbed the “Arab Spring”. The Western media as well as political decision makers appear to be paralyzed in the face of such fast developments.

Syria is only one part of the “New Arab World”, but is also perhaps its most complex member. A highly diversified structure of ethnic and religious identities has shaped this “Cradle of Civilization” for centuries.

Like other states of the Fertile Crescent, many different people coexist in Syria: Kurds, Druze, Alavis, Shi’a Muslims and more than ten different Christian denominations, as well as the majority group of Sunni Muslims who are themselves divided between the more devout conservatives and secular modernists. Along with tradition come modern ideologies which only add further complications to the stability of the political landscape.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 6 – May-June, 2011

Like a pilot flying across the Pacific, building any capability and capacity to address a variety of governance challenges requires a good plan. A good pilot is meticulous in the development of a well-researched flight plan that takes into consideration the route, passenger safety and comfort and the amount of fuel needed for the journey; and the resulting plan is the creation and responsibility of the pilot. When it comes to developing good governance in Africa, the genesis and execution of that plan requires the insight and desire of Africans in concert with a variety of international partners.

Like Africa, the pilot is not alone. Others help to survey the routes, provide weather forecasts, tune communication networks, deliver the fuel and prepare the passengers for flight. These prior actions provide the pilot with an important framework that allows the flight to be governed and managed after it begins.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 6 – May-June, 2011

The ongoing war in Afghanistan has significantly shifted the objectives of military intervention and the perception of successful development efforts. As a result of this difficult and complicated engagement, successful stabilization and reconstruction is no longer solely the responsibility of state actors and NGOs.

Today, capacity building programs are the lasting derivative of development efforts implemented by organizations and corporations. Where non-governmental development organizations provide funding to create the infrastructure or micro-loans crucial to fostering emergent economies, private companies reinforce those gains by providing employment and skills training to local populations as they execute essential tasks such as building roads or training police forces.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 6 – May-June, 2011

The earthquake was a game changer for the U.N. Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH. Not only did it present the peace operation with an overwhelming natural disaster to manage, but it also brought in a wide range of international actors, including U.S. and Canadian military forces numbering over 20,000 to manage the immediate aftermath of the humanitarian crisis. MINUSTAH went from a multidimensional peace operation to a rescue effort that far exceeded its capacity or original mandate.

Even though MINUSTAH lost more than 100 souls in the tragic events of January 12, 2010, including its head of Mission, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Hédi Annabi and scores of other leaders, the military component labored to provide security. It also managed the other U.N. agencies flooding into the country. The secretariat was able to send a replacement leader, the former SRSG Edmond Mulet, back to Haiti to perform the promethean task of rebuilding the mission, supporting relief and reconstruction, and strengthening governance. MINUSTAH’s original drawdown date was scheduled to commence in 2011 when conditions had improved and state institutions had greater capacity. However, a Special Session of the U.N. Security Council, held on April 5, 2011, suggested that the presence of a U.N. Mission will extend beyond that date, and with a different profile.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 6 – May-June, 2011

In the 1990s, the world had completely forgotten Afghanistan and thanks to the Taliban regime, Afghan women were probably the most isolated human beings on Earth. They were deprived of the traditional freedoms granted by Afghan culture, as well as the equal rights they were later guaranteed under Afghanistan’s post-Taliban constitution. Even though Afghan women were silently suffering as the primary victims of factional infighting and the atrocities committed against them by various warring parties, they were rarely featured, or even mentioned, in the news reports on Afghanistan’s protracted war.

In 1997, one courageous American woman, Mrs. Mavis Nicholson Leno, succeeded in breaking global silence on the suffering of Afghan women. Unfortunately, her call for action against the suppression of not only Afghan women, but the entire Afghan nation, failed because Afghanistan no longer enjoyed the strategic importance it previously had in the last decade of the Cold War. Had the United States remained firmly committed to Afghanistan’s post-Cold War stabilization and reconstruction – after the West helped Afghans defeat the Soviet forces – Afghan women and children would not have been exposed to unspeakable atrocities throughout the 1990s.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 5 – March-April, 2011

Thanks to a group of conscientious governments, contractors and civil society groups, the International Code of Conduct (ICoC) was finalized in November 2010 as a set of good-practice principles for private security contractors. The human rights community sees a lot of promise in these principles, not least because civilians harmed on the battlefield might finally have their losses recognized and properly addressed.

Most promising is the impending creation of an oversight and governance mechanism — or more simply, a watchdog to monitor what contractors who sign onto the ICoC are doing right and wrong. That hard work will be done over the next 18-months by a committee. Their discussions so far have focused on what should happen to rogue contractors, from concerns about domestic murder laws and investigations, to criminal liability and prosecution. This committee, though, will only get the job half right if they do not also focus on what the victims of contractor violence will receive for their hardship.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 5 – March-April, 2011

Six years have passed in Sudan since the signing of the 2005 peace agreement ended a twenty-year civil war in which two million people were killed and over four million were displaced in a nation with little or no medical care for its people. The clinics in South Sudan were few and far between, had little or no equipment or quality medication, and were staffed with overworked and underfunded medical professionals. It was not uncommon for the sick and injured to walk for two or three days to see a doctor. In an environment that is rife with malaria, typhoid, parasites, deadly snakes and a host of other diseases, Sudan continues to suffer from some of the highest mortality rates in the world.

The lack of access to quality healthcare has impacted both the Sudanese and the internationals living in South Sudan, creating a crisis situation when one becomes sick or injured. However, things are slowly changing. The end of the civil war has brought back many professionally trained former refugees who are now leading the charge to improve basic health services. Recently, oversight and regulations of medical providers have been implemented, and credentials and licenses are now required to provide medical care, thus assuring patients that anyone calling themselves a medical doctor has actually received a medical degree.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 5 – March-April, 2011

Establishing mutually beneficial relationships with local national populations is often critical to private companies’ operational success in conflict and post-conflict areas — PAE credits much of its success to developing strong relationships with local nationals. Whether building peacekeeper base camps in Darfur or helping to train the new national army in post-conflict Liberia, our practice of hiring local labor has evolved into a strategy for developing capacity within the host country population. This strategy, which has been implemented successfully in Liberia, Djibouti and Afghanistan, among other countries, combines three key aspects of employee development and is implemented with the support of management teams.

Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 6, Number 4 – January-February, 2011

In order to advance contingency operations in Africa, there must be increased advocacy for the use of private military, security, intelligence, and logistics contractors in support of international stability operations.

Most support for the concept of practicality stems from situations where too few peacekeepers are spread too thin, do not possess the necessary skill sets and capabilities, and thus are unable to respond effectively. The stability operations industry is more than capable of filling a specific void, whether due to an inherent lack of personnel and resources, or shortcoming of political will at home. A case in point is the Horn of Africa.

In the most understated terms, the political situation in Somalia can be described as highly unstable. The ongoing civil conflict between the struggling Transitional Federal Government and the battling Islamist factions within, including al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, persists with increasing hostility.

Even with international assistance from both the United Nations and African Union, the situation remains extremely fragile, while peacekeeping operations remain relatively ineffective. Additional international assistance from other nations able to contribute security forces is lacking, if it exists at all. We see this apathy not only in Somalia, but  also in conflicts plaguing the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan.