Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 5, Number 6- May/June 2010
Delayed Approach
AT 4:53 p.m. on January 12, 2010, the earth shook violently and relentlessly, destroying the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of people in the process. The entire world paused as graphic images of pain, suffering and destruction flooded the media, galvanizing an outpouring of relief in the form of military and foreign aid, volunteers and donations. A magnitude 7.0 earthquake started the clock in a race against time to find signs of life and provide bare necessities to those who survived. For every life saved, hundreds of children were orphaned, husbands widowed, parents childless and still millions more without food and shelter. These were the circumstances that confronted the Evergreen International Aviation team and so many others when they responded to one of the Western Hemisphere’s most devastating natural disasters in history.
Over the last 50 years, the company has provided airlift support to all manner of operations, from the Indian Ocean tsunami to shipping school supplies to schools in Najaf, Iraq. In continuing its support of critical humanitarian missions worldwide, the company dispatched a team of staff and equipment to assist in the Haiti relief effort with a range of services, such as moving large quantities of cargo into theater, transporting aid workers to remote locations via helicopter and assessing damage to structures such as orphanages with unmanned vehicles.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 5, Number 5- March/April 2010
A bleak and desperate task.
TWO months have passed since a devastating earthquake destroyed Haiti’s capital city of Port-au-Prince and several nearby communities. With over 200,000 dead, an equal number injured and more than 300,000 without homes, we are only now becoming aware of the scale of destruction that Haiti sustained in the mere 30 second duration of the earthquake. It is the largest recorded disaster in the Western Hemisphere.
Devastation of this kind would stop even the most developed of nations. A quick glance at the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the city of New Orleans exemplifies the way in which natural disasters create chaos. Even with federal organizations such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) the logistical challenges of evacuating people, setting up emergency shelters and providing food and water were difficult to execute. In Haiti, a country that is at best fragile and at worst teetering on the edge of state failure, the situation is exacerbated. This earthquake tests a nation whose government buildings are no longer standing, whose public records are lost and whose president holds his cabinet meetings at a table set up under the shade of a mango tree. Only a year and a half ago, Haiti was hit with three consecutive hurricanes that buried the port city of Gonaive under tons of mud, killed several thousand citizens and flooded many parts of Port-au-Prince. When the earthquake struck on January 12, Haiti was just beginning to emerge from the disaster these hurricanes had wrought.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 5, Number 4, January – February 2010
SINCE 2004, the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime in Sana’a, Yemen has been confronted by the steadily escalating al-Houthi rebellion, based in the northern city of Sa’ada. Because most of the rebellion’s supporters come from the minority Za’idi sect of Islam, some commentators (ignoring the fact that the president of Yemen is himself a Za’idi) have seen the rebellion as an implicit sectarian conflict. This, however, is to ignore the many tensions the regime faces, including both religious and secular factors, and an incipient rebellion in the country’s south. It also overlooks the fact that governance in Yemen has always been a contingent affair, given the uncertain reach of government power beyond the capital and major towns.
The argument, however, cannot be ignored. Today — in the wake of an Iranian offer of mediation — the Yemeni government insists that the rebellion is a manifestation of growing Iranian interference in regional affairs, directed against Saudi hegemony in the Peninsula. Now that fighting has spilled over the Saudi Arabian border, the Saudi government would no doubt agree. However, a close examination of the origins of the rebellion itself leaves little doubt that its causes are primarily domestic in nature.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 5, Number 3- November/December 2009
AFGHANISTAN is currently the subject of substantial national and international debate. For many Americans, their nation’s involvement has to date been at too high a price for so little achieved. 8 years of U.S. involvement have brought over 5,000 American casualties — a steep price for a small reduction in Taliban influence.
Now, there appear to be two major schools of thought on the next step: escalation, meaning more American troops and more casualties; or withdrawal. There are, of course, thousands of variations on these two basic themes; but all tend to revolve around two key questions: Can the United States succeed, and what does success mean?
What are the metrics of success? As a nation and as a people, Americans seem to believe democracy is a critical element. It may well be that to dry up the Taliban sea in which Al Qaeda swims, Afghanistan requires at least the appearance of a legitimate democratic government. Thus, elections appear imperative. Of course, one can have elections without democracy, as demonstrated by the Soviet Union and dozens of developing world nations. However, the converse is also true; among other things, to be a democracy, one needs to have regular, fair and honest elections.
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 5, Number 2, September – October, 2009
Amigos: Uribe y Bush, Colombia y Estados Unidos
THE U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) has received much bad press of late. It has escalated anxieties in an already tense neighborhood and become fodder for saber-rattling leaders looking to distract attention from weak economies and failing domestic policy. It has been cited as proof by left-wing analysts from around the world as one more advance in a long-running U.S. imperialist campaign in the region. Very little attention, however, has been paid to the actual details of the agreement or the factors which motivated its negotiation. Properly understood, the DCA is a logical step in the expansion of a beneficial strategic partnership between two nations; it also provides a fairly standard example of the kind of military cooperation contracts that exist throughout Latin America and the rest of the world.
One of the biggest misunderstandings about the U.S.-Colombia DCA centers on the details of the agreement itself. First, and most importantly, the agreement does not allow the installation of U.S. military bases on Colombian soil. It merely permits U.S. access to three Colombian air force bases, two army installations and two naval bases, with the option to expand access to other military facilities upon mutual agreement. An official release from the U.S. State Department explains, “Command, control, administration, and security will continue to be handled by the Colombian armed forces. All activities conducted at or from these Colombian bases by the United States will take place only with the express prior approval of the Colombian government.”
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 4, Number 4 – January-February, 2009
U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
ON November 16, 2008, the executive branches of the United States and the Republic of Iraq approved a status of forces agreement (SOFA) providing for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq no later than December 31, 2011, and regulating the presence and activities of U.S. forces in Iraq in the meantime. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki signed ceremonial copies of the SOFA in Baghdad on December 14.
Behind the SOFA
The United States and Iraq were under significant pressure to execute a SOFA before December 31, 2008, the expiration date of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007) which had extended the “mandate of the multinational force in [Iraq] – ‘for the last time.’” Both governments issued public statements in the months of negotiations leading up to the signing of the SOFA insisting that an agreement authorizing the continuing presence of U.S. Forces in Iraq must be reached before the expiration of Resolution 1790.
Eager to get the SOFA signed and to herald Iraq’s sovereignty, the U.S. government acceded to Iraq’s demand that U.S. contractors be denied the immunity previously granted to them under Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 17. Under CPA Order 17, contractors could not be arrested or detained by Iraqi authorities and were “not subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms and conditions of their contract.”
Journal of International Peace Operations
Volume 4, Number 1 – July/August, 2008
“Inherently governmental?”
AS a matter of policy, the United States federal government has long limited the functions that can be performed by the private sector to those that are not “inherently governmental.” In order to avoid an “unacceptable transfer of official responsibility to Government contractors,” the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) promulgates the executive branch policy that prohibits service contractors from performing any inherently governmental functions, and offers the following definition:
[A]n “inherently governmental function” is a function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government employees. These functions include those activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying Government authority or the making of value judgments in making decisions for the Government.
OMB guidance offers 19 category examples of what is an inherently governmental function, and the same number of examples of what is not inherently governmental. Additional guidance appears in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Department of Defense regulations, and the U.S. Code. But in the last six months, amid mounting media criticism of “outsourcing” and “privatization,” several key government officials have expressed concern that the existing definitions supporting the “inherently governmental” limitation are inadequate.
